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This work project aims to analyse the acquisition of German cable operator Kabel 
Deutschland by the British telecommunications company Vodafone in September 2013. 
Analysis of the technologies and German telecommunications sector reveals the sources 
that motivate a transaction. The acquirer needs to find a way to react to the increasing 
demand for data on internet connections. Also, Vodafone has a weak infrastructure of 
fixed line and thus is missing a strong network to be able to offer the full Quad-Play 
services (TV/Fixed-Phone/Internet/Mobile). The acquisition target is a company with a 
strong cable network in place that is a good alternative to provide modern internet 
connections. Both companies seem to be highly complementary and would benefit from 
a merger by getting an improved competitive position and readiness for the Quad-Play 
trend. The offer price per share is with €87 per share 24% above the standalone DCF 
valuation and represents an attractive premium for target shareholders. Discounting the 
claimed Synergies by acquirer Vodafone result in an NPV of €4.5 billion. This means 
that Vodafone is paying away 33% of the Synergies to the target. However, Vodafone 
shareholders can still expect to gain from the investment as cost synergies seem credible 
and sufficient to cover the premium. 
Key Aspects: German telecommunications industry, Quad-Play trend, 
Synergy credibility and Premium Paid 
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1. Background Analysis  
In order to understand the underlying reasons why the phone-operator Vodafone buys 
cable operator Kabel Deutschland, the technologies and operating environment that are 
part of the discussion need to be clarified. 
a)  Technologies 
The main services that are part of the analysis include fixed-phone, mobile-phone, TV-
services and Broadband Internet. In order to understand why companies start to offer 
these services combined (Quad-Play), it is useful to analyse how the internet affected the 
cable and telecommunications sector. 
When the internet opened the isolation of local area networks (LANs) and connected 
computers on longer distances in the 1990s, it used a network that was already in place 
since the 1860s.1 The network used was the telephone system, which was originally 
designed to carry sounds but successively used to transmit other signals. In order to meet 
increasing demand for internet and usage of phone& internet at the same time, 
improvements like broadband internet connections showed up.1   
However, telephone lines were never designed to carry computer data and households 
being connected to the old-fashioned copper-wire technologies have problems getting a 
fast connection to meet increasing data demand for computers. Therefore, a new fibre 
optic infrastructure is built in order to replace the old-technology of copper-lines.1 
The other network that showed to be able to provide internet access to households is the 
cable television infrastructure. Nowadays used for providing phone, cable and internet to 
                                                          
1 Woodford, June 27th 2013 
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households, cable operators effectively start to compete with the traditional 
telecommunications operators and offer even faster connections.2 
A similar development occurred in the cell phone network as smartphones and computers 
were able to connect to the internet using the mobile broadband. Mobile Internet means 
here being connected through a radio tower to a cellular telephone service provider.3 
While this way of connecting is of growing importance due to smartphones, tablets and 
laptops it can effectively compete with the wired telephone networks.3 As different 
networks start to compete for the same customers, the idea of offering all services 
combined rather than duplicating network investments is referred to the Quad-Play.  
b) German Telecommunications Industry 
 
After clarifying the technologies that affect the industry in which both companies of the 
deal operate, this section gives an overview about size and recent development. The Sales 
and market share over the last three years by segment are shown in Appendix 1-Table 1. 
Sales have not changed much in the overall sector, remaining almost constant from 2011 
to 2012F (€57.92 billion to €57.98 billion). Table 1 also shows that fixed and mobile 
services dominate sales (42% and 45% in 2012F), while cable still plays a minor role 
(7.55% in 2012F).  
The overall data volume transferred has more than doubled from 2010 to 2012 as can be 
seen in Appendix 2 – Graph1.4 Differentiation in the technology used to get internet 
access to households shows another interesting trend as shown in Appendix 3 – Graph 3. 
While the classical way of connecting homes through Analog & ISDN lost importance 
                                                          
2 Kabel Deutschland and unitymedia Website (100MB/s)  
3 Woodford, June 27th 2013 
4 Year 2010 were 65.4 Gigabyte compared to 140 Gigabyte in 2012 as in Appendix 2 
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over the last four years (-6% CAGR), the new technologies of DSL and fibre cable (HFC, 
FTTH, FTTB)5 gained importance (32% and 27% CAGR).  
c) Industry Changes 
Before turning to the current main players in the market, it is worth to mention that the 
German telecommunications industry was strongly affected by regulatory actions. A 
number of reforms was initiated by authorities to restore competition in the market at the 
end of the 20th century and still has effects on the current industry dynamics. The reforms 
made were Postreform I (1989) which separated the business of German monopolist 
Deutsche Bundespost into three operating segments (Postdienst, Postbank, and 
Telekom).6 Later, with the Postreform II (1995) those businesses were privatised and 
went public in order to meet increasing capital investments.  From the beginning of the 
21th century, the emerged Deutsche Telekom was furthermore forced to sell its cable 
network in single parts to different investors (Kabel BW, Kabel Deutschland, 
unitymedia). 6 The liberalization is responsible for the current situation in the industry and 
the split of the cable operators into Kabel BW, Unitymedia and Kabel Deutschland.7    
d) Competitive Environment 
Having analysed the macro trends and recent history in this industry, it is worth analysing 
the main players and their services offered. The first segment and probably most 
important one in this analysis is broadband internet, where target and bidder operate. The 
Ranking of current German broadband operators by connections to households is shown 
in Appendix 4- Graph 3. The graph shows that the industry is dominated by market leader 
                                                          
5 Hybrid Fibre Coaxial, Hybrid to the Home and Hybrid to the Building 
6 Bundesanstalt für Post und Telekommunikation – Deutsche Bundespost, 2013 
7 Kabel Deutschland, 2013 
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Deutsche Telekom who almost holds half of the connections on the entire market, while 
Vodafone and others have to split the rest of the market between them. 
The next important segment involves analysing the mobile service providers. Appendix 
5 - Graph 4 shows that the mobile market is consolidated with 4 main operators in the 
market. Telekom and Vodafone have a leading positioning over their competitors with 37 
and 34 million customers, respectively. Recent announcements about a merger between 
the two smaller operators E-Plus and O2 might change the whole competitive 
environment in the German market8. A new phone giant would evolve that would be 
larger than the current market leader Telekom. The merger, if approved is planned to 
evolve in 2014 and would result in higher industry concentration and probably a change 
for consumers. 
Having seen the main broadband and mobile players, this section turns to the main cable 
operators. The three large cable operators are Kabel Deutschland, Kabel BW, Unity 
Media and several smaller local operators. By 1st of July 2012, Liberty Global, the owner 
of unity media bought Kabel BW and consolidated both operators to “Unitymedia Kabel 
BW”9. The consolidation is currently stopped by regulatory authorities and subject to 
further investigation10. As shown in Appendix 6- Graph 5, Kabel Deutschland would still 
be slightly ahead of the merged entity by having 7.6 million customers, while Kabel 
BW/Unitymedia have a combined customer base of 7.1 million11. “Unitymedia Kabel 
BW” focuses on the three federal states of North Rhine Westphalia, Hesse and Baden-
Württemberg, while Kabel Deutschland serves the other 13 federal states.12 Both main 
                                                          
8 Thelocal.de retrieved on 23th July 2013  
9 Unitymedia (01.07.2012) 
10 Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, 2013  
11 Both companies Annual Report FY 2013 
12 Both Companies Websites (www.kabeldeutschland.de and www.umkbw.de)  
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players offer the triple-play services of TV, Internet and phone over their own network in 
place13.  
2. The Acquiring Company: Vodafone Group PLC 
 
Vodafone Group PLC is one of the biggest mobile services company on a global scale, 
operating in over 30 countries with revenues of over 44.4 billion pounds in the last 
financial year of 201314. The company sees itself to operate in a very dynamic and 
competitive market that brings up several challenges and has a wide range of strategic 
objectives to react to the challenges in this industry15. The most recent trends in the global 
operating environment as described by Vodafone are promising opportunities in emerging 
markets (demand for data service/growth) and challenging pressures in Europe 
(regulatory/economic).14 Vodafone entered the German telecommunications market back 
in 1999, where it acquired Germany’s second largest fixed-line telephone and internet 
provider Mannesmann (D2- Mannesmann Network) in a $183 billion stock exchange.15 
In order to get a better understanding of the company’s internal and external situation, a 
SWOT analysis is conducted and can be found in Appendix 7. While Vodafone is a 
company with global exposure, the analysis focuses on its presence in the German 
telecommunications market, where the transaction will take place. Summarising, the 
SWOT analysis shows that Vodafone has a strong position in its core lines of business 
(mobile phone market leader, strong brand recognition, mobile network state of the art 
technology) while it has weaknesses when it comes to the fixed line business. Vodafone 
                                                          
 
13 Company Websites (www.kabeldeutschland.de and www.umkbw.de)  
14 Vodafone Annual Report 2013, Page 3 
15 www.vodafone.com 
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is strong in the core of its business mobile, as it has 35% of the German market measured 
by revenue. On the one side, the fixed line business is still a weakness for the company, 
being dependent on its main competitor Deutsche Telekom for using its ready network in 
place. On the other side, the fact that Vodafone has not made a step yet to invest more in 
its fixed line network is also a major opportunity to improve its competitive position. 
Facing increasing demand on mobile and broadband connections, an investment in a 
stronger network would enable Vodafone to offer unified services of mobile and their 
own fixed line. The Threats in the external environment are due to the economic crisis in 
Europe and regulatory changes that lead to decreasing margins and low cost competitors.  
3. Target Analysis: Kabel Deutschland  
a) Company Overview 
 
Kabel Deutschland describes itself as Germany’s largest cable operator and probably 
biggest national cable network in Europe with reaching over 15 million homes.16 The 
services provided include a wide range of offerings for TV and telecommunications. 
Customers can select from a wide range of premium TV products (as HD digital TV), fast 
internet (up to 150Mbit/s) and fixed-phone services over the cable network.16 The cable 
company serves 8.5 million homes and is serving in 13 of 16 federal states. Furthermore, 
the company believes that it is well positioned as a triple-play provider to benefit from 
strong growth and a consolidating German market.16 
Similar to the analysis of Vodafone, a SWOT analysis has been conducted and can be 
found in Appendix 8. Summarising, the most important Strength to the company’s 
success can be seen in the modern cable network in place that is able to deliver modern 
                                                          
16 KD Annual Report, 2013 Page 14 and 15 
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digital TV services and very fast internet (up to 150 Mbit/s). The firm has a strong brand 
recognition and can be seen as the market leader in this segment (cable internet) with the 
largest customer base. Macroeconomic pressures have not strongly affected the company 
in Germany, as revenues were growing over the last years. A weakness of the firm is the 
limit to set prices of their services as most of them are limited by a maximum through 
either contracts or regulatory authorities. The customer base is also struggling to grow 
further and growth is coming from adding additional services of premium TV to the 
existing customer base.17  
Major opportunities are good prospects for the German cable market, as there is 
increasing demand for high speed connections to households and the increasing 
importance for premium TV. As the fixed-line phone and internet are growing, Kabel 
Deutschland expects to gain from lower instalment costs per customer. The major threats 
for the company is the dynamic characteristic of the industry where technological changes 
can have a huge and fast impact on firm performance (e.g. mobile internet). The pressure 
to offer Quad-Play services might also be a major threat for the company, as Kabel 
Deutschland is not a mobile network operator. The company has increasing operating 
costs that might also threaten the profitability in this business, as regulation and 
consolidation put pressure on margins. 
b) Financial Statement Analysis 
In order to get a first impression of Kabel Deutschland’s financials, appendix 9 shows the 
Balance Sheet for FY 2012/13 and appendix 10 the Income Statement for the last three 
financial years. The balance sheet shows a negative equity position of -1.48 billion in FY 
                                                          
17 Kabel Deutschland Annual Report 2013, Page 27 
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2013 and a Total debt to Assets ratio of 1.5. The high level of debt is higher in comparison 
to direct competitor Kabel BW/Unitymedia that has a Total Debt to Assets ratio of 0.9618. 
However, interest Payments are easily covered out of operating profits, having an interest 
coverage ratio of more than 2.1 in FY 201319 (Kabel BW/Unitymedia 0.5420). The Rating 
of Kabel Deutschland’s outstanding bonds is BBB+ and therefore upper-medium 
investment grade.21 
Total Revenues grew by 7% CAGR from 2011 to 2013 which is mainly due to strong 
growth in the Phone& Internet Segment (CAGR 17%22). Margins are increasing, looking 
at EBITDA/Sales23 ratio in the last three years by 1.65% which is a positive development. 
The result for EPS has been increasing over the last three years from -0.5 (FY 2011) over 
1.8 (FY 2012) to 2.8 (FY 2013). Kabel Deutschland expects this positive trend in their 
financials of increasing EBITDA to persist. While the traditional business of basic TV 
services is declining, premium TV services and Internet & Phone can drive the future 
success of the company. The company expects to benefit from increasing internet 
penetration in the market, winning market shares of the cable operators from DSL and 
premium digital TV services. 
c) Comparable cable Companies 
In order to get a comparable picture of KD as a cable operator, the following sections 
discusses some selected ratios of the company itself and chosen peer operators from other 
countries. In finding peer competitors, the criteria have been: a) national cable operator 
                                                          
18 Kabel BW/Unitymedia Annual Report 2012 Page II-3 and II-4 
19 EBIT/Interest Expense of 1.8 (FY2012) and 2.1 (FY 2013)  
20 Kabel BW/Unitymedia Annual Report 2012 Interest Coverage Ratio 0.5 (2011) and 0.54 (2012) 
21 Rating from 17.10.2013 Kabel Deutschland Website 
22 KD Annual Report 2013 Page 108 and Annual Report 2012 Page 59 
23 EBITDA/Sales FY 2011 to FY 2013 see Appendix 10 Income Statement 
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in Europe b) 1- 8 billion market capitalisation c) operating in the triple play (without 
significant mobile business). In order to compare the company before any influences of 
the deal could show up in the stock price, we used numbers from the financial year 2012.  
Four European companies qualified for a direct comparison and the chosen ratios were 
Price/Earnings and EV/EBITDA as can be seen in Appendix 11. The average P/E ratio 
for fiscal year 2012 of the 4 peers was 21.2 with KD having a value of 26.4. A higher P/E 
ratio tells us that investors expect higher earnings growth in the future. Considering the 
fact that KD paid the first dividends in 2012 (€1.5) and 2013(€2.5), high expectations for 
the future do not seem surprising. The next chosen ratio is EV/EBITDA as an indicator 
of whether KD is in total valued higher than its peers. Finding an average value of 7.2 for 
the 4 industry peers, KD has a quite high multiple of 11.66 and is thus valued higher 
compared to its peer cable operators.  
4. Rationale of the Deal 
 
Having discussed both involved companies and analysed the German 
telecommunications industry, the following section narrows down to the rationale of the 
deal from the discussed aspects. The aim of analysing the rationale is to find the forces 
that ultimately lead to the decision of both companies to merge. This part of the analysis 
is especially important to assess the credibility of the claimed Synergies and communicate 
the findings to investors.  
a) Synergies in Theory 
As a starting point, the improvements achieved through the synergies should be classified. 
Common improvements can occur through revenue enhancements, cost reductions, asset 
Work Project at Nova School of Business and Economics                              Christoph Beck       
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reductions, tax reductions, financial synergies24. Revenue Enhancements might occur 
through cross selling or cross branding between both firms of the deal. Typical Cost 
reductions can be further categorised in Economies of Scale (as capacity utilization, 
purchasing power) and Scope (as technology, know how). Asset reductions might be 
more of a one-time effect by closing headquarters or unused plants among others. Tax 
reductions can include an increase in depreciation tax shields and transfer of net operating 
losses from target to the buyer. There might also be financial synergies involved in a 
transaction as the Coinsurance effect where the cash flows of both firms are not perfectly 
correlated.24 Through one or several of these Synergies, the combined entity has a larger 
value than the sum of both firms individually.  
a) Deal-specific Sources of Synergies 
Besides finding a wide range of strategic reasons to combine two companies into a 
stronger, single one, it is important for valuation purposes to find Synergies that can be 
quantified. Furthermore, research found that investors discount cost savings less, while 
synergies of other origin more.25 Thus, decomposing the Synergies and searching for their 
origin helps to determine a degree of credibility for them. Furthermore, the form of 
payment stock or cash is another indicator of the risks involved in the synergies.  
The claimed synergies by Vodafone are composed of two types of synergies. The first 
type are Cost reductions through Opex & Capex Synergies.26 Opex is expected to be 
reduced through overlapping activities in the distribution network, IT and SG&A. Capex 
are expected to be lowered through less expenditures in the networks and the backbone 
where Vodafone owns its own fixed-line network. Vodafone estimates a value of 300 
                                                          
24 Bruner, 2004 Page 328 
25 Bruner, 2004 Page 60 
26 Operating and Capital Expenditures 
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million per year in gross value, pre integration costs. Appendix 12 shows a more detailed 
discussion of the cost reductions and their origin. These claims sound credible rather than 
being broad or vaguely defined and therefore should be included in this analysis. Cost 
Synergies are also a widely accepted driver of M&A activity to achieve savings in 
overlapping areas.27  
The other type of synergy and probably most doubtful are expected revenue 
enhancements by opportunities in cross-selling in each other’s footprint and increased 
customer loyalty. These enhancements are expected to increase yearly revenue by about 
150 million pre-tax. However, with the mentioned prevailing scepticism in the eye of the 
investor for synergies other than cost cutting, those expectations need more investigation.  
While these ideas make rational sense in theory, it is harder to include them in the same 
way as cost savings. Looking at the cross selling potential, Kabel Deutschland offers 
successfully TV-Internet-Phone while Vodafone offers Internet-Phone-Mobile. The 
question is where potential cross selling should appear and whether there might be a 
degree of Churn in favour or against increasing the Synergies.  
Existing companies show that bundling the “triple package” of Phone-Internet-TV works 
well, however the idea of adding a fourth product mobile services is not well tested yet. 
The idea is that customers of Kabel Deutschland that are not using Vodafone as their 
current mobile provider might accept all four offerings from the same operator. However 
it might not be an easy task to convince consumers to switch providers, especially if they 
are committed in long term contracts. Also migrating the existing Vodafone ULL 
customers to cable might force them to sign a new contract and relocate the router in a 
                                                          
27 Bruner, 2004 Page 60 
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different part of the house (Effect of Churn).28 Thus, there are some reasons why the 
revenue enhancements might not turn out to be as high as expected.  
The form of payment has another important implication for the synergies of the deal. It is 
found that returns to target shareholders are higher when the form of payment is in cash, 
while for buyers the payment in equity exceeds all-cash deals in the European Union.29  
The theory is that managers should be willing to pay in shares when they believe their 
stock is at the peak of the cycle. The fact that the Vodafone – Kabel Deutschland deal is 
a 100% Cash offer might be an indicator that the management of Vodafone assumes a 
reasonable priced stock. Another implication of the Cash Offer is that the execution risk 
of the synergies is completely in the hands of Vodafone shareholders. As the payment 
involves a premium to Kabel Deutschland shareholders, the risk of realizing all claimed 
synergies and earning the premium back is within the hands of Vodafone shareholders. 
The longer it takes to realize Synergies and if not realized as expected, the more costly it 
is for Vodafone shareholders. Thus, management should be quite sure of realizing most 
of the claimed synergies, as they impose a greater risk for their shareholder’s returns. 
5. Valuation and Price Paid 
 
In order to analyse the value of the deal and the price paid, it is useful to look at the deal 
from a value creation framework. First, value is only created if present value of the 
combined Cash Flows is greater than it would have been if the deal was not completed. 
Second, value for Vodafone is only created when the value received is larger than the 
price paid to the target.  
                                                          
28 J. Dellis, U. Rathe, N. Amjad and G. Thorne 2013 Page 1 
29 De Pamphilis 2010 page 31 and 32 
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Therefore, the first step is to determine a standalone value of Kabel Deutschland by 
discounting expected future cash flows or looking at the market price pre-announcement 
of the transaction. As shown in Appendix 13, using forecasted financial statements for 
the time period 2014-2017, the valuation results in an Enterprise value of around €8.92 
billion. In order to get the price per share, the calculation subtracts net debt from 
Enterprise Value and divides by the number of shares. Using net debt of 2.8 billion and 
outstanding shares of 88,400,000, the implied share price is around €69.5. This estimated 
share price is in line with the 6-month average of Kabel Deutschland’s traded share price 
before official announcement of the deal which is around €67. Having an estimation of 
Kabel Deutschland minimum value worth, it is possible to calculate the premium paid by 
Vodafone. The Deal was finally settled at €87 per share and thus represents a 24% 
premium on top of our standalone estimation. 
In order to assess the premium paid, the next step in the calculation is to value the 
estimated synergies net of integration costs. Appendix 14 gives an overview of the 
expected synergies and integration costs. Vodafone estimates through these Synergies 
more than €300 million in annual cost and Capex Savings after the fourth year of 
completion. Revenue Enhancements are expected to be €150 million also after the fourth 
year of completion. Integration costs are expected to be €300 million over the first four 
years. Without further notation by Vodafone, the calculations assume that integration 
costs are split with 40% in the first year and 20% in the following three years.  
In order to make a NPV estimate of the synergies and compare it to the claimed value by 
Vodafone, some assumptions have to be made. Assuming that the profits that result from 
the Synergies are taxed in the country of origin (Germany), the calculations apply the tax 
rate of the target. Furthermore, even as this is a cross-country transaction, we do not make 
any country specific adjustments to the discount rate of the acquirer as the United 
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Kingdom and Germany should be relatively high integrated. Vodafone is planning to 
integrate the operations of Kabel Deutschland but might still not experience a significant 
effect on their cost of capital due to relatively small size of the target. Appendix 14 shows 
that these assumptions lead to a NPV of total Synergies net of integration costs of around 
€4.5 billion. Using this estimate, the maximum value worth of the target from Vodafone’s 
perspective should be around €122 per share30. Looking at the premium paid to Kabel 
Deutschland and comparing it to the estimated Synergies, Vodafone is paying away 
around 33% of total synergies.31  
The previous analysis of the claimed synergies by Vodafone has shown that cost synergies 
seem credible, while revenue enhancements should be included carefully in our analysis.  
In order to address the uncertainty with the revenue enhancements, Appendix 15 shows a 
sensitivity analysis for the realization of synergies and the effect on the theoretical value 
worth of Kabel Deutschland shares. The table can give a good overview in how much of 
expected Synergies in Cost or Revenue have to be realized in order to cover the price paid 
for the target. Note that the previous discussion on synergies revealed that the risk of 
realizing them is totally in the hands of Vodafone shareholders, as the payment is 100% 
in Cash. Keeping this in mind, the sensitivity analysis shows that the transaction needs to 
realize at least 50% of the claimed cost synergies in order to not overpay. 
6. Stock Market Reactions 
 
In order to get a complete picture of both firms and their market presence, the following 
section discusses the historical stock price movements. Vodafone group PLC was 
                                                          
30 Standalone value calculated €70 per share plus (4.5 billion /88.690.000 shares) 
31 Calculated by the estimated prices in the above paragraphs:  (€87) - (€70) / (€121 - €70) 
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originally listed on 11/10/1988 with GBP170 per share32. Kabel Deutschland was listed 
on 22/03/2010 with EUR22 per share33. Appendix 16 gives an overview over the 
historical stock price of both companies.  
The performance of Kabel Deutschland’s stock has been strong since its IPO three years 
ago by an increase of 200% in the price34. A first hint that Vodafone might be interested 
in Kabel Deutschland was given  at the Q3 IMS conference call on 7th February where 
CEO Vittorio Colao said that  M&A in the fixed line segment is ‘’on the cards’’. This 
announcement didn’t trigger any significant stock price movement, with Kabel going 
down around 1% and Vodafone going up 1%. The first rumours that Vodafone might be 
interested in making an offer for Kabel Deutschland came up in the news on 13th of 
February where a stock jump of 8.7% was seen for Kabel Deutschland while Vodafone’s 
stock decreased by 1.1%.  
On 12th of June, Vodafone “confirms to have made a preliminary approach to KD 
regarding a possible offer for the company”.35 At this time there was no definite statement 
about the terms involved or whether a deal will ultimately be made. Nevertheless the news 
were sufficient to lead to a market reaction that increased KD’s share by about 9% to €81 
per share and above in the following days as shown in Appendix 17. Vodafone’s stock 
reacted negative with a decrease of 4.9% after the announcement.  
Vodafone confirmed its intention to offer €87 per share (including a 2.5 div) on 24th of 
June where the stock price was already trading around the implied value of €84.5. As can 
be seen, there is not an immediate jump that is triggered by an announcement by 
Vodafone, but rather a heating stock price based on rumours that Vodafone is about to 
                                                          
32 Vodafone.com 
33 Kabeldeutschland.de 
34 IPO share-price: EUR22 Undisturbed stock price in February 2013: EUR66 
35 www.vodafone.com  
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make a move this year and the probable offer price. Overall, the news for an 
announcement had a significant positive effect on KD stock (8.7% and 9.1%) while VOD 
stock reacted negative (-1.1% and -4.9%). This might be an indicator that stock holders 
expected the deal to create value for KD shareholders probably through a high premium, 
while VOD shareholders don’t expect the deal to be favourable for them.  
7. Financing the Deal 
 
The structure behind financing a deal is important as it has a direct impact on the capital 
structure, debt capacity and value of tax shields of the combined new entity. Vodafone 
decided to pay the total amount in 100% Cash to Kabel Deutschland shareholders. 
Furthermore, Vodafone said it would finance the Deal with the use of existing Cash 
resources and banking facilities. Choosing a form of financing a deal has direct effects on 
the financial statements of the combined firms. In general, while the decision  to finance 
the deal more with stock than Cash creates more flexibility as no Cash on hand or 
borrowing capacity is consumed36.               
Vodafone estimates that a deal would raise group net debt to EBITDA by about 0.4 to 
2.437. As a first indicator, the rating of a company’s debt is important to reflect the capital 
structure health, access to debt market and communication to shareholders. According to 
Moody’s, the increase in Vodafone’s debt would lead to downgrade to BBB+ from prior 
A- credit rating due to an increased debt burden38. While this would mean a significant 
burden on Vodafone’s balance sheet by decreasing Cash on hand and increasing debt 
significantly, announcements of a dividend to be paid out from Verizon Wireless end of 
                                                          
36 Bruner, 2004 Page 574 
37 Vodafone Investor Presentation 24th June 2013 “Cash Offer for Kabel Deutschland” 
38 Dattani and Wittig, 2013 Page 2 
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June 2013 will regain strength in the balance sheet. Also the announced sale of 
Vodafone’s stake in Verizon for US$130 billion should enable management to regain 
strength and rebalance debt and Cash to target levels39.        
Thus, the stretch of Vodafone’s capital structure does not seem to impose excessive risk 
on the company’s ability to pay its debt and management has flexibility to restore target 
levels through the Verizon sale in the United States. 
8. Medium Term Effect 
 
Investors, Company executive and other involved stakeholders are generally concerned 
about the short term effect on EPS40 due to a transaction, even though it is clear to most 
of them that long term value is not directly tied to this limited measure.41 Thus, while 
calculating EPS, it is important to note that we should not rely entirely on the conclusion 
drawn by analysing this single measure.  
a) Earnings per Share Effect 
The concern about EPS is focused on the midterm effect over year 1 and 2 of the 
acquisition with the most frequently questions asked whether the deal is increasing 
(accretive) or decreasing (dilutive) EPS. While analysing EPS in an acquisition, it is 
necessary to include the effects of the transaction as method of payment, integration costs 
and synergy effect. Appendix 19 shows the formula used for calculating the effect on EPS 
in this transaction. Due to relative size of Vodafone’s net income and the small impact of 
Kabel Deutschland’s net income, it is more useful to first look at the effects of the merger 
separately.                  
                                                          
39 www.vodafone.com 
40 (Net Income - Dividends on preferred stock)/Average Outstanding Shares - Bruner, 2004 page 328 
41 Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2010, Page 13   
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As the number of shares stays the same, the only effect on EPS comes from net income 
of Kabel Deutschland plus any effects of the transaction (synergies, integration costs, 
increased interest payments). Using expected net income of Kabel Deutschland for the 
next years, Integration costs (as calculated before) and additional interest payments for 
half of the acquisition value, EPS show to be accretive from year one after the merger. 
This finding is in line with Vodafone’s assumption. 
b) Cash Flow Effect 
Another medium term measure is the effect on FCF due to an acquisition and needs to be 
analysed. Combined FCF of Vodafone and Kabel Deutschland, including any effects of 
the synergies and integration costs are shown in Appendix 20.  An overview of the Cash 
Flow effect in the years following the transaction is visualized in Appendix 19. Cash Flow 
shows to be slightly dilutive in year one of the acquisition even without accounting for 
the Offer price paid in Cash. From year two onwards, Cash Flow is accretive and reaching 
high growth in some years ahead. The negative impact on Free Cash Flow in year one is 
especially due to the assumption of integration costs that might be highest in year one 
after the transaction. Looking ahead, the positive impact of the Deal is only effective in 
year 4, where Cost and Revenue Synergies are expected to show up for the first time. 
9. Comparable Transactions 
In order to get a better sense for the price paid for KD in this deal, it is useful to put the 
deal in the context of comparable transaction as shown in Appendix 21. The deal values 
KD at 11x2014f EBITDA which seems to be out of the range of comparable transactions 
that changed ownership for an average of 8.22x EBITDA. This multiple however, falls to 
6.3x 2014 EBITDA post Synergies and is then lower than comparable transactions that 
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had an average of 7.35x EBITDA. Thus, comparing the price paid for KD to historical 
transactions shows that the Synergies will have a huge impact on the success of VOD as 
the price paid is well above what was paid for cable transactions before. While the 
synergy analysis has shown that Vodafone shareholders bear low risk in overpaying for 
this deal, an analysis of the comparable transactions has shown that Kabel is valued much 
higher with multiples than other targets.  
However, higher synergies for Vodafone might make reasonable sense when checking 
the acquiring companies used in our comparable transactions. Mainly acquired by Liberty 
Global, there is no comparable cable transaction that has the same strategic acquirer in 
the position as VOD to be operating a mobile& fixed line business in the same geographic 
region as the target. Thus, our historical cable transactions can at best give us a rough 
comparison, but not lead to any reliable conclusions whether Vodafone paid a reasonable 
control premium. 
10. Risks Analysis 
While the analysis has shown that the deal offers clear sources of value that justify paying 
a premium for the target, it is necessary to describe the downside potential through various 
sources of risk. Analysis of the technologies showed that the mobile network is improving 
constantly and is able to compete with the fixed line network. Substitution of the fixed 
line network through mobile connections is referred to the term “wireless-substitution”.42  
Another source of risk derives from the competitive nature of the German 
telecommunications market and consolidating pressures. While quasi monopolist 
Deutsche Telekom has shown to loose market value over the last years, even a merger of 
                                                          
42 Blumberg and Luke, 2012 
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Vodafone – Kabel Deutschland would not end its dominance in the broadband segment. 
Other competitive pressure would come from a merged entity of O2 and E-Plus (mobile) 
and Kabel BW/Unitymedia (cable) if the mergers get approval by regulatory authorities. 
These competitive and consolidating pressures might lead to more price competition and 
Quad-Play offerings.               
Regulation has shown to play a major role in the German telecommunications sector, and 
the abandonment of Kabel Deutschland’s bid for Telecombus has shown that authorities 
leave no action without investigation. A regulated decrease in MTRs43 might be one 
example where revenue growth is limited even though with high growth prospects in the 
market. Specific remedies set by authorities as effect for the merged entity might also 
reduce expected synergies. Overall, there are some sources of risk that might have a 
negative impact on both firms. However, all of them are based on the nature of the 
telecommunications sector in the German market and both firms would be exposed to 
them even without the transaction.  
11. Deal Analysis  
 
After detailed discussion of different aspects of the deal, this section summarises the main 
findings. First, the analysis of the technologies used to connect households to the internet 
shows some interesting insights. The original infrastructure was never built to connect 
households to the internet and firms are struggling to update their network and deliver 
high speed connections. This finding is problematic for firms as the demand for data has 
shown to increase significantly over the last years. However, cable operators have shown 
to be a good alternative in delivering internet with a high level of speed. Mobile internet 
                                                          
43 Mobile Termination Rates (Rates charged to other companies for using owned network) 
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is another technology that is updating delivery speeds rapidly and competes with the 
traditional ways of internet connections.  
Analysis of the German telecommunications market shows that regulatory authorities 
play a major here. While the overall sector is dominated by Deutsche Telekom in mobile 
and broadband, Vodafone shows up to be strong in mobile as well. The cable market 
shows to be highly concentrated but still plays a minor for internet connections. There 
was recent announcement of a merger in the mobile and cable sector of different 
companies, which would increase industry concentration even more.  
Analysis of the acquirer Vodafone has shown, that the British telecommunications 
company entered the German market with a large acquisition of a network in 1999. The 
strength of the operator are brand recognition and fast mobile connections. However, the 
company has deficits in the fixed-line network, where it has to rent the network of main 
competitor Deutsche Telekom and pay fees. The company is not yet a full Quad-Player, 
having these deficits in its fixed line and no significant TV business.  
The Target Kabel Deutschland is Germany’s largest cable operator, offering the Triple 
play of TV-internet-phone over its modern high speed network. The operator benefits 
from increasing internet demand and their premium TV business by having their modern 
network already in place. Threats might emerge from the Quad-Play trend if other 
competitors would offer combined services. Also the growing importance of the mobile 
network in delivering fast internet might reduce the advantage of a fixed infrastructure in 
place. While the financials show negative Equity and a high level of debt, the outlook is 
positive according to company statements and development over the last years. Using 
multiples and comparing the cable operator to peer companies shows that the market 
affirms the positive outlook. 
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The rationale of merging both companies is that their businesses are highly 
complementary and can strengthen their competitive position. Vodafone can address its 
needs to strengthen its fixed line network and make the next step into the Quad-Play. The 
dependency on its main competitor Deutsche Telekom and the implied fees for using its 
rented lines can be reduced. By acquiring a cable operator with a high-speed connection 
in place, less investments in an own network need to be made and the position of Deutsche 
Telekom is attacked. Kabel Deutschland can benefit from being part of a larger company 
that offers the Quad-Play and has a stronger competitive position. Consolidation in the 
mobile and cable sector in Germany show that the trend is higher industry concentration 
and targets might become rare, thus an investment is better now than in the future.  
Valuing Kabel Deutschland on a standalone basis resulted in an implied share price of 
around €70 per share which is in line with the traded share price before any 
announcements of the transaction. Using this standalone value, the €87 per share offer 
represents a 24% premium for Kabel Deutschland shareholders.  
Vodafone expects Cost Synergies of €300 million and Revenue Enhancements of €150 
million per year after the fourth year of completion of the deal. Analysing the Synergies 
resulted in an NPV estimation of €4.5 billion post integration costs. The maximum 
implied share price that Vodafone should be willing to pay for Kabel Deutschland is thus 
€122 per share. Vodafone is paying away 33% of the total Synergies to Kabel 
Deutschland shareholder with the premium offered. While cost synergies seem to be 
credible, the revenue enhancements include execution risk and might not be realized in 
full. However, sensitivity analysis has shown that revenue synergies do not need to be 
realized in full as long as most cost synergies show up.   
Stock market reactions show that rumours were heating up the stock price rather than a 
one-time reaction to announcement of the deal. The reaction on official announcement of 
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the offer was positive for the target and negative for the acquirer. This implies that the 
acquiring shareholders do not expect the deal to create significant value for them. 
Analysis of the financing ability of Vodafone shows that the deal would just slightly 
stretch its capital structure. The increased debt burden would result in small a downgrade 
of existing debt while still remaining at an acceptable level of risk. The recent transaction 
of selling its stake in Verizon Wireless should also enable Vodafone to restore target 
levels of debt.  
Analysis of the medium-term reaction showed that EPS will be accretive from year one, 
while FCF will be accretive from year two. This finding might be important for investors 
that are generally concerned with the medium-term effect of an M&A transaction.  
Comparing the deal to historical transactions shows that the target is bought at a 
significant higher multiple of EBITDA pre-synergies which changes to slightly lower 
post-synergies. The implications of multiples analysis however should not conclude with 
an overpayment or too high synergies by Vodafone. The reason is that Vodafone differs 
to the historical strategic buyers like Liberty Global that do not intend to integrate the 
Quad-play or reduce payments for using the local loop.  
Thus, the Vodafone Kabel Deutschland deal has unique reasons on the buyer’s side that 
justify a premium. Overall, Vodafone shareholders can expect to get an improved 
competitive position in Germany and realize a significant return on this deal. Even if 
revenue enhancements might not show up, cost synergies still cover the premium paid to 
the target. The transaction is also a major step to follow the convergence trend and invest 
in its own cable network in the German market. Being one of the first providers of Quad 
Play services might lead to upside potential of the deal through revenue enhancements 
and customer loyalty. Executing this deal now is the right decision to avoid being late in 
the Quad-play segment and pay a higher price for attractive targets in the future. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of the German telecommunications market (2010-2012f) 
 
All numbers in   2010  2011  2012f 
billion, Euros   in billion€ in %  in billion € in %  in billion € in % 
Sales Total   59.15    57.92    57.98   
Fixed Line         26.30 44.46  25.13 43.39  24.58 42.39 
Cable   3.79 6.41  3.99 6.89  4.38 7.55 
Mobile   25.84 43.69  25.55 44.11  26.07 44.96 
Others   3.22 5.44  3.25 5.61  2.95 5.09 
Table 1 (Source: Bundesnetzagentur, 2013) 
Appendix 2: Data volume in German Mobile Networks 
 
Appendix 3: Development of the fixed-line segment in the (2008-2012f) 
Graph 2 (Source: Bundesnetzagentur, 2013)  
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Graph 1: (Source: Bundesnetzagentur, 2013) 
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Appendix 4: Market Share of leading Broadband providers (Q4 2012) 
  Graph 3 (Source: dsl.web.de Broadband report Germany Q4 2012) 
 
Appendix 5: Leading mobile-service providers in Germany  
 
Graph 4 (Source: dslweb.de Report Q4, 2012) 
 




























































Graph 5 (Source: Both companies Annual report for the Financial Year 2013)  
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Appendix 7: SWOT Analysis Vodafone Group, PLC 
 
Appendix 8: SWOT Analysis Kabel Deutschland 
 
Strengths 
• Global Scale Operator (Economies 
of Scale& Scope, Diversified) 
• Market Leader with 35% service 
revenue share in Germany 
• State of the art Network  4G  
• Brand strength (Purchasing 
decision for customers!) 
• Strong Distribution Network and 
Retail in place 
 
Weaknesses 
 Dependency on Deutsche Telekom 
and its fixed cable network 
 Dependency on the traditional 
lines of business, no offering of 
converged services in most 
markets (Quad-Play) 
 Competitive Position to Deutsche 
Telekom weak  
Opportunities 
• Demand for data on both mobile 
and broadband explodes 
• Unified communication services of 
fixed and mobile 
• Quad Play market is not developed 
yet – possible targets 
• 45% Verizon Wireless sell of 
US$130 billion to invest in Europe 
• Access next generation fixed line 
infrastructure 
Threats 
• Macroeconomic pressure  
• Regulation lowered barriers to 
entry  
• Price Ceilings 
• Low cost competitors (mobile 
virtual network operators) 
• Competitors offer 4-Play 
• Substitution of traditional mobile 




















 Powerful, own state of the art 
network in place  
 Market Leading position, biggest 
customer base  
 Growing Revenue  
 Mostly Unaffected by the crisis 
 Almost all payments in EUR, no 
exchange rate exposure 
 No Seasonal Effects, yearly 
payments in Jan/Feb. 
 Stable Cash Flows and budgeting 
Costs reliably 
 Strong EBITDA margin (47.1% 2013 
to 35.0% 2006) 
Weaknesses 
 Part of the network is through 
Renting/Leasing 
 Price increases are limited through 
contracts& regulatory authorities  
 New staff membership needed due 
to growth (knowledge) 
 Total Customer Base not growing 
 No own mobile network, 











Graph 6 (Source: Vodafone Annual report for the Financial Year 2013)  
 




Appendix 9: Balance Sheet - Kabel Deutschland (see Attachment to this Thesis) 
 
Appendix 10: Income Statement of Kabel Deutschland (see Attachment to this Thesis) 
 
Appendix 11: Multiples Comparison: Selected national cable operators 
 
Company Market Cap (billion) Price/Earnings EV/EBITDA 
Kabel Deutschland 6.4 26.4 11.66 
European Comparable:    
Ziggo NA Equity 5 25.8 12.3 
ZON Optimus 1 21.7 5.1 
Virgin media 7.5 25.4 6.4 
TDC DC (Denmark) 4.4 11.9 5.1 
Average  21.2 7.2 
  Table 3 (Source: Bloomberg) 
Opportunities 
 Lower installment costs through 
more penetration of customer in 
the segment phone& internet 
(EOS) 
 Increasing Demand for high-speed 
Internet (100 Mbit/s) 
 Good prospects for the German 
cable market – offers advantaged 
to the broadband internet 
 Increasing Revenue by adding 
more premium contracts 




 Increasing competitiveness in the 
Internet-TV business 
 Increasing Operating costs and 
Inflation Exposure 
 Very Dynamic industry, 
technological changes threat 
 Regulatory prohibition of 
acquisitions (Telecombus, Feb 
2013) 
 Slowly decreasing number of direct 










Graph 7 (Source: Kabel Deutschland Annual report for the Financial Year 2013)  
 
Work Project at Nova School of Business and Economics                              Christoph Beck       
Page 34 
 




Appendix 13: DCF Valuation Kabel Deutschland (see Attachment to this Thesis) 
Appendix 14: Synergy Overview (see Attachment to this Thesis) 
Appendix 15: Sensitivity Analysis of Synergies (Implied Price per share in EUR) 
  
Cost Synergies (net of integration costs) Realized 
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Yearly Savings of EUR120mNetwork/ IT
•Kabel Deutschland infrastructure in place for backhaul
•Merge national and regional backhaul 
•Consolidate and simplify IT & Close overlapping offices where KD has fixed line services in place
Yearly Savings of EUR120ULL/ bitstream
•Save ULL + bitstream fees by migrating VOD customers from rented lines to KD cable infrastructure
Yearly Savings of EUR60mCentral functions
•Overlapping functions
•Efficiencies in property and procurement
Figure 1: (source: Vodafone press release 24th June 2013 “Cash Offer for Kabel Deutschland” – 
Investor Presentation) 
 
Graph 8: Calculations with the previous forecast of standalone value and Synergy estimates 
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Appendix 16: Historical Share Price Vodafone and Kabel Deutschland 
 
 
Appendix 17: Selected Stock movements of Vodafone and Kabel Deutschland 
 
 
Appendix 18: Effect of financing decision by Vodafone (see Attachment to this Thesis 
 



























































Graph 9: finance.yahoo.com 
 
Graph 10: finance.yahoo.com 
 
Graph 11: finance.yahoo.com 
 
Graph 12: finance.yahoo.com 
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Appendix 20: FCF Effect of the Transaction 
 
 




Appendix 22: Consolidated Financial Forecasts Vodafone and Kabel Deutschland (see 
Attachment to this Thesis) 
Appendix 23: Calculation Vodafone Weighted Average Cost of Capital (see Attachment 
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Graph 13: Consolidated statements as from Appendix 22 and Synergy Estimates  
 
Graph 14: Equity Research Report Kerven, Dallal, and Wallace 25th June 2013 BofA Merrill 
Lynch 
 
Graph 15: Equity Research Report Kerven, Dallal, and Wallace 25th June 2013 BofA Merrill 
Lynch 
 





Attachment to the Work Project: Vodafone – Kabel Deutschland Merger 
 
Appendix 9: Balance Sheet - Kabel Deutschland 
 
Appendix 10: Income Statement of Kabel Deutschland FY 2011 - 2013 
Income Statement FY2011 to 2013 ended 31.March 2013  (in thousands, Euros) 
 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
Sales 1,599,000.00 1,700,000.00 1,830,000.00 
COGS 870,000.00 905,000.00 968,000.00 
EBITDA (adjusted) 729,000.00 795,000.00 862,000.00 
Depreciation & Amortization 490,000.00 396,000.00 350,000.00 
Integration costs & non-recurring -    32,000.00 -     27,000.00 -     79,000.00 
EBIT 207,000.00 372,000.00 433,000.00 
Interest Income  4,000.00 3,000.00 3,000.00 
Interest Expense -  273,000.00 -   202,000.00 -   206,000.00 
Income from associates 4,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 
EBT -    57,000.00 176,000.00 226,000.00 
Total Tax 12,000.00 -     16,000.00 21,000.00 
Net profit -    45,000.00 159,000.00 240,000.00 
    
EPS -            0.50 1.78 2.71 
shares outstanding 90,000.00 89,408.17 88,522.94 
Balance Sheet FY ended 31.March 2013 (in thousands, €) 
    
 Current Assets    Current Liabilities   
 Other Current Assets        30,305.00    Other Current Liabilities      700,786.00   
 Inventories        51,899.00    Short-Term Borrowings        40,130.00   
 Accounts Receivable - Trade      131,226.00   Total Current Liabilities      740,916.00   
 Cash and Equivalents      609,547.00     
 Total Current Assets      822,978.00    Non-Current Liabilities   
   Other Noncurrent Liabilities      150,559.00   
 Noncurrent Assets    Long Term Debt   3,383,119.00   
 Other Noncurrent Assets        81,845.72    Total Noncurrent Liabilities   3,602,864.00   
 Property Plant & Equipment - 
Net   1,308,864.00     
 Total Intangible Assets - Net      641,371.00   Stockholder Equity   
 Total Non-Current Assets   2,039,790.00   Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit)  -1,595,320.00   
   Other Equity  -     42,273.00   
 Total Assets   2,862,768.00   Additional Paid In Capital        68,058.00  
   Common Stock        88,523.00  
   Total Shareholders Equity  -1,481,011.00   
    
   Total Liabilities and Shareholders Equity   2,862,768.00  
Table 1 (Source: Kabel Deutschland Investor Relations Release FY 2012/13) 
 
 
Table 2 (Source: Kabel Deutschland Investor Relations Release FY 2012/13) 





Appendix 13: DCF Valuation Kabel Deutschland 
 
Financial Forecast Kabel Deutschland ( in million, Euros except per share) 
 2013/14 E 2014/15 E 2015/16 E 2016/17 E 
Revenues     1,994.00     2,137.00      2,256.00          2,403.00   
Operating expenses     1,052.00    1,102.00      1,129.00           1,183.00   
EBITDA         942.00    1,035.00      1,127.00           1,220.00   
D&A         424.00         426.00          510.00               587.00   
EBIT         518.00         609.00         617.00               633.00   
Taxes (30%)         155.40         182.70        185.10               189.90   
NOPLAT         362.60         426.30         431.90               443.10   
     
plus: D&A         424.00         426.00          510.00               587.00   
less: Capex -      624.00   -    631.00   -     540.00   -          537.00   
less: increase NWC           63.00             5.00           13.00                   6.00  
     
FCF            99.60         216.30          388.90               487.10   
     
Discount Factor                1.05                1.10                 1.15                      1.21    
DCF            94.95         196.56          336.90    
Terminal Value             9,938.67   
Discounted Terminal 
Value 
            8,207.46   
Implied Enterprise Value      8,920.56      
Net Debt      2,757.00      
Equity      6,163.56      

















Debt 0.34  30% 2.98% 1.01% 
Equity 0.66 5.8%   3.83% 
Inputs:      





Beta 0.48 Outstanding 
Shares 
       
88,690,000.00    
  
Risk Free Rate 
Estimate 
3% Market Value Debt 3 billion   
 
Table 3: Financial Forecasts from Equity Research Report: „Kabel Deutschland – Bidding 
Competition set off“ from 18th June 2013 by Commerzbank Corporates and Markets 
Table 4:  Bloomberg, www.kabeldeutschland.com and Company Annual Reports 





Appendix 14: Synergy Overview (all numbers in EUR, millions) 
Yearly Forecast   1 2 3 4 5 
Revenue    150 150 
Opex    240 240 
Integration Costs -120 -60 -60 -60   
Sum -120 -60 -60 330 390 
Sum After Tax (30%) -84 -42 -42 231 273 
Capex       60 60 
Sum Synergies -84 -42 -42 291 333 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Discount Rate 1.06 1.12 1.18 1.25 1.32 
      
DCF -79.49 -37.61 -35.59 233.30  
Terminal Value     5862.68 
Discounted Terminal Value 4447.66     




Appendix 18: Effect of financing decision by Vodafone 
 (All numbers in million, GBP)  2013 Post-Merger Change 
Net Debt  26,958.00 31,860.00 4,902.00 
EBITDA 13,275.00 13,275.00  
Net Debt/EBITDA 2.03 2.4 0.4 
 in million, GBP  2013 Post-Merger Change 




Appendix 19: EPS Formula for an All Cash Offer 




 …where 𝐸𝑇+𝐴 is the sum of current earnings of target and acquiring Company plus any Effects of 
synergies on earnings 
…where 𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  is the additional cost of debt used to finance the transaction  
… where NA is the amount of shares of the acquirer 
 
 
Table 6:  Equity Research Report Dattani and Wittig 24th June 2013 as listed under References 
 
Table 5:  Vodafone press release 24th June 2013 “Cash Offer for Kabel Deutschland” and Equity 
Research Report: Dattani and Wittig 24th June 2013 as listed under References. Justification of 
Discount Rate as shown in Appendix 23 
 
 

















2013/14 E 2014/15 E 2015/16 E 2016/17 E 2017/18
Revenues:
Combined  55,978.52 € 56,362.00 € 56,755.09 € 57,177.56 € 57,608.62 € 
Revenue Enhancements -  €             -  €             -  €             150.00 €       150.00 €       
Operating expenses:
Combined 38,993.67 € 39,144.86 € 39,301.08 € 39,484.75 € 39,662.05 € 
Opex Savings 240.00 €       240.00 €       
Integration costs(Total 300million) 150.00 €       51.00 €         51.00 €         51.00 €         -  €             
Depreciation & Amortization:
Combined 1,406.14 €    1,020.05 €    1,104.05 €    1,181.05 €    1,248.28 €    
EBIT 15,428.71 € 16,146.10 € 16,298.96 € 16,850.76 € 17,088.29 € 
Tax Rate (30%)
Combined 4,628.61 €    4,843.83 €    4,889.69 €    5,055.23 €    5,126.49 €    
NOPLAT
Combined 10,800.10 € 11,302.27 € 11,409.27 € 11,795.53 € 11,961.80 € 
plus: Depreciation &Amortization 1,406.14 €    1,020.05 €    1,104.05 €    1,181.05 €    1,248.28 €    
less: Capex 8,383.52 €-    8,377.43 €-    7,958.77 €-    7,641.96 €-    7,315.22 €-    
Capex Savings -  €             -  €             -  €             60.00 €         60.00 €         
less: increase NWC 214.38 €-       273.57 €-       278.67 €-       285.67 €-       285.67 €-       
Free Cash Flow
Combined (without any Effects) 4,142.10 €    4,254.16 €    4,868.92 €    5,382.99 €    5,907.53 €    
Combined (with Cost/Revenue/Integration) 4,037.10 €    4,218.46 €    4,833.22 €    5,680.29 €    6,240.53 €    
Combined Financial Statements including 
Synergies in EUR, million
Table 5:  Equity Research Report Financial Forecasts from Equity Research Report a) „Kabel 
Deutschland – Bidding Competition set off“ from 18th June 2013 by Commerzbank Corporates 
and Markets and b) “Approaching Kabel Deutschland” from 13th June 2013 by Natixis Equity 
Markets 
 





Appendix 23: Calculation Vodafone Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
Vodafone WACC Inputs: 
Source of Capital Proportion of Capital Cost of Capital  
Debt  25% 2.5%  
Equity 75% 6.7%   
  WACC: 5.68% 
    
Cost of Equity  Cost of Debt  
Risk Free Rate 
Ger10Y 
2.00%   





5.90% Corporate Tax rate 30.0% 
Implied cost of 
Equity 
6.72% After Tax Cost of 
Debt 
2.49% 
    
Capital Structure (millions, GBP)   
Market Cap                    104,676.50    75.49%  
ST Debt                      12,001.00    8.65%  
LT Debt                      21,991.00    15.86%  
Total                     138,668.50    100.00%  
 
 
Table 4: Source Bloomberg 
